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(1987) Naturalistic epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Sagal criticizes naturalistic epistemology genetically for falling short of the mission of justifying the sciences with "no circles and no gaps," and he outlines a program, essentially along the lines of Paul Lorenzen's constructive philosophy, which is intended to carry out that mission. I shall present some reasons for believing that the constructive program is unachievable. The answer which I shall then offer to Sagal's criticisms of naturalistic epistemology is based in large part upon the inevitability of curtailing our philosophical ambitions.
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Full citation:
Shimony, A. (1987)., Comment on Sagal, in A. Shimony & D. Nails (eds.), Naturalistic epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 333-336.
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